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Abstract 
The United States Department of the Treasury responded to the Global Financial Crisis with 
an economy-wide stimulus package called the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). 
Within the portion of TARP’s budget dedicated to bank investments, about $570.1 million 
was disbursed to community development financial institutions (CDFIs)—specifically, 
banks and credit unions (depositories)—in a program called the Community Development 
Capital Initiative (CDCI). Through the CDCI, Treasury provided capital to CDFI depositories, 
encouraged them to lend to small businesses, and promoted other community-oriented 
goals. The CDFI depositories issued either preferred shares or unsecured subordinated 
debentures to Treasury at low (2%) interest rates for the first eight years, and high (9%) 
rates thereafter. Two of the 84 participating CDFI depositories remained in the program as 
of October 2020. Only one recipient failed. The financial health of participating CDFI 
depositories is viewed to have generally improved after the investments were conducted. 
In late 2016 and early 2017, 26 of the participants were allowed to pay back Treasury 
capital at a discount usually 7% or 8% beneath notional value. 
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1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the Global Financial Crisis that pertain to broad-based capital 
injections. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at  
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/. 






At a Glance 
After the Global Financial Crisis, the US 
Department of the Treasury created the 
Community Development Capital Initiative 
(CDCI) to serve low-income and 
underbanked communities by injecting 
capital into community development 
financial institution (CDFI) depositories. 
CDFI depositories were banks, thrifts, credit 
unions, and nonprofit loan funds that 
Treasury had certified to be eligible for 
financial and technical assistance through 
the CDFI program. Treasury collaborated 
with federal regulators to review 
applications, identify eligible and viable 
institutions, fund them, monitor 
participants, and wind down investments. 
The CDCI program was introduced more 
than a year after the Capital Purchase 
Program (CPP), a larger Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (TARP) initiative that 
provided capital to commercial banks 
during the crisis. Most CDCI funding 
represented a revision to CPP investments 
that Treasury had already made in banks 
and thrifts that were CDFIs—but on better 
terms. The CDCI was also the first crisis-era 
program available to credit unions.  
Throughout 2010, Treasury purchased 
either preferred stock shares or unsecured 
debentures from CDFIs, depending on the 
type of institution. All participants followed 
similar capital restrictions and payment schedules, transitioning themselves back to 
private stakeholders within an eight- to 30-year timeframe. Through the CDCI, Treasury 
extended low-cost capital while prioritizing taxpayer interests within CDFI payment 
schedules. 
Summary Evaluation 
Treasury did not announce a maximum investment amount, allocated $780.2 million, and 
ultimately disbursed approximately $570.1 million to 84 institutions, 36 banks and thrifts 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “To provide support to Main Street banks, 
thrifts, and credit unions that lend to small 




February 3, 2010  
Application 
Window 





February 3, 2010–September 
30, 2010  
Legal Authority Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008; 
Troubled Assets Relief 
Program; Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010  
Peak Utilization  ~$570.1 million provision of 






Institutions (CDFIs) approved 
by Treasury and their primary 
federal regulator  
Administrators US Department of the 
Treasury; various federal 
banking agencies  
US Community Development Capital Initiative 
(CDCI) 
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and 48 credit unions, through the CDCI program. As of October 2020, 82 of the original 84 
institutions had exited the CDCI program: 54 fully repaid, 26 repurchased early, one went 
into bankruptcy, and one exited through a merger. Of the two remaining institutions, both 
partially repaid and one partially repurchased early. The outstanding balance stood at 
nearly $1 million, less than 1% of the original disbursement. Due to write-offs, the CDCI is 
currently estimated to fall $70 million short of full-redemption value—given Treasury 
assumptions about market risks. Participants showed generally improved financial health 
after receiving Treasury investments. In late 2016 and early 2017, 26 of the participants 
could pay back Treasury capital at a discount usually at 7% or 8% below notional value. 
Treasury was criticized for exhibiting poor communication by equivocating the program’s 
objectives—a general criticism of TARP—and failing to collect regular information from the 
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United States Context 2009–2010 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$14,628.0 billion in Q4 2009 
$15,240.8 billion in Q4 2010 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$47,100 in 2009 
$48,468 in 2010 
Sovereign credit rating  
(five-year senior debt) 









Size of banking system 
$9,789.1 billion in  
total assets in 2009 
$9,292.3 billion in  
total assets in 2010 
Size of banking system as a  
percentage of GDP 
66.9% in 2009 
61.0% in 2010 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
Assets equal to 30.2%  
of financial system in 2009 
Assets equal to 28.5%  
of financial system in 2010 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 
44.3% of total banking assets  
in 2009 
46.0% of total banking assets  
in 2010 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
19.0% of total banking assets  
in 2009 
16.0% of total banking assets  
in 2010 
Government ownership of banking system 
0% of banks owned by the state 
in 2010 
Existence of deposit insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up 
to $100,000 for 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up 
to $250,000 for 2010 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. 
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In 1994, Congress passed the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act, which established the Community Development Financial Institution 
(CDFI) Fund (CDFI Fund n.d.-a). The US Department of Treasury uses the CDFI Fund to 
promote local economic development by providing financial and technical assistance to 
financial institutions that Treasury has certified as CDFIs (CDFI Fund n.d.-d). CDFI 
certification requires institutions to conduct at least 60% of lending and other economic 
development activities in areas underserved by traditional financial institutions (Treasury 
2010i). CDFIs can be regulated banks, credit unions, or nonprofit loan funds. Treasury 
financial assistance can be in the form of loans, grants, equity investments, deposits, and 
credit union shares, which CDFIs are required to match dollar-for-dollar with nonfederal 
funds (CDFI Fund n.d.-a). Currently, there are more than 1,000 CDFIs located throughout 
the United States (CDFI Fund n.d.-c). 
By late 2008, the Global Financial Crisis was in full swing in the United States. On October 3, 
2008, President George W. Bush signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), 
which granted Congress the authority to purchase troubled assets from financial 
institutions (EESA 2008, sec. 3). Within the EESA, the Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(TARP) initially granted Treasury $700 billion—an amount that was later reduced to $475 
billion, after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act on July 21, 2010 (Dodd-Frank 2010). Treasury disbursed public funds into five 
program areas: credit markets, the automotive industry, struggling homeowners, the 
insurance corporation American International Group (AIG), and the banking sector 
(Treasury 2016c). Of the $250 billion of TARP funds disbursed to the banking sector, 
$780.2 million was allocated to the Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) 
(SIGTARP 2010c). 
In launching the CDCI, Treasury officials emphasized its focus on local financial institutions 
and their customers. “It’s a common misconception that TARP funds only went to large 
Wall Street firms, but the CDCI program is yet another example of how TARP is providing 
critical assistance to Main Street financial institutions,” noted Herbert Allison, Treasury 
assistant secretary for financial stability (Treasury 2010i). The CDCI arrived at a time when 
private capital had receded from community development financial institutions’ primary 
funding sources—banks, foundations, and socially motivated investors (Barr 2010). Donna 
J. Gambrell, director of Treasury’s CDFI Fund, remarked, “At a time when many institutions 
have pulled back, CDFIs have actually increased their lending and investments in 
underserved communities. These CDCI investments will enable community banks, thrifts, 
and credit unions to spur economic development in the communities that have been hit 
hardest by the economic downturn” (Treasury 2010i). At the onset of the program, 
Treasury framed its recapitalization of CDFI depositories as an effort to reach their low-
income and underbanked clients (Treasury 2010i).  
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Though Treasury’s initial language suggested that the program was meant to impact the 
participants’ underlying communities via lending and investment, Treasury later revised its 
wording and claimed that the program was meant to help institutions achieve their 
individual economic development goals (GAO 2011; Treasury 2010i). The government’s 
rhetorical inconsistencies throughout the lifespan of the program—combined with weak 
participant reporting—made it difficult to assess the ex post benefits and drawbacks of the 
capital injections. Treasury’s goalpost-shifting is described in greater detail within the 
“Evaluation” section of the case study. 
Program Description 
Treasury first announced the CDCI on February 3, 2010 (Treasury 2010h). Since its 
origination, the CDCI was presented as a complement to the already running Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP), a TARP initiative that extended “capital to viable financial 
institutions of all sizes throughout the nation” (Treasury 2016b). In the initial press 
release, the CDCI was referred to as a “TARP enhancement,” and its capital terms 
(dividend/interest rates, step-up clauses, diversity of eligible institutions) were explicitly 
framed as more favorable than those of the CPP (Treasury 2010h). CDCI eligibility 
extended to CPP participants that were certified CDFI depositories and sought lower-cost 
capital. Treasury and Government Accountability Office (GAO) frequently combined CDCI 
and CPP data in public documents. 
Treasury allocated $780.2 million for the program and held an application window 
between February 3 and April 30, 2010—an end date that was pushed back from April 2 
(SIGTARP 2010c). Transactions took place between February 3 and September 30, 2010 
(Treasury 2010i). These purchases were conducted with Treasury funds, and the CDFI 
liabilities and equity were kept on the federal government’s balance sheet (Massad and 
Kashkari 2018).  
To review applications and actively monitor its capital injections, Treasury partnered with 
one or more federal regulators: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
(Treasury 2010a).3 These partnerships were necessary because different financial 
institutions fell under the jurisdiction of different federal regulators (Treasury 2010a).  
The CDCI channeled public funds to CDFI banks and credit unions (depositories). According 
to this case study’s external reviewer, most CDFIs are nondepositories, so the CDCI was 
available to a minority subset of the total number of CDFIs at the time that the program 
was announced. Eligible institutions for the CDCI were US financial institutions certified as 
CDFIs by Treasury’s CDFI Fund and regulated by a federal banking or credit union agency 
(Treasury 2010a). If an institution was eligible, the relevant federal regulator made a 
recommendation to Treasury about the institution’s financial viability prior to the CDCI 
investment (Treasury 2012a). The regulator also considered in its viability assessment any 
private capital raised in conjunction with the CDCI capital injection (Treasury 2012a). Upon 
receiving applications, Treasury discussed the CDFI depository’s eligibility and viability 
with the primary regulator to either deny or accept the application.  
 
3 Under §312 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision merged with the OCC, the Fed, the FDIC, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Dodd-
Frank 2010). Though the OTS was listed in the original CDCI documentation, its CDCI responsibilities were 
spread across the other regulators upon the OTS merger. 
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Participating CDFI depositories were subject to extensive terms and conditions set by 
Treasury. As long as Treasury held at least 10% of its initial investment, the CDFI 
depository had to allow Treasury (along with Treasury’s affiliates) to manage, evaluate, or 
transfer Treasury’s investment (Treasury 2010b). The 10% threshold also entitled 
Treasury to examine and make copies of the CDFI depository’s corporate books, and to 
discuss the affairs, finances, and accounts with the institution’s principal officers.  
In addition to data access, there were several covenants that the participating CDFI 
depository had to agree to follow. For example, the participant had to retain its status as a 
certified CDFI and needed to provide Treasury with the certification and documents to 
verify this status, consent to any Making Home Affordable (MHA) modification made by any 
nonaffiliated mortgage servicer, and participate in Treasury’s MHA program under certain 
circumstances (Treasury 2010g).  
Furthermore, the CDFI depository was not allowed to engage in any mergers or other 
significant corporate transaction, subject to undefined exceptions (Treasury 2010g). It also 
faced restrictions on common stock repurchases and dividends, including an increase of 
the aggregate per share dividend over the immediately prior fiscal year.  
Capital terms were similar across CDFI depositories yet tailored according to the type of 
institution.  
CDCI terms did not explicitly demand any changes to the existing board or management. 
However, there were limits on executive compensation and bonuses. CDCI participants 
were subject to the same executive compensation bonuses as other TARP participants 
(Treasury 2012a).  
Treasury’s shares were generally nonvoting. However, except for credit unions, Treasury 
retained the right to vote on any authorization or issuance of capital shares ranking senior 
to its investment; any amendment to its rights; or any merger, exchange, dissolution, or 
similar transaction that would adversely affect its rights. In the event of excessive 
nonrepayment of CDCI capital dividend/interest, Treasury gained voting rights and could 
place individuals on the board of the CDFI banks or thrifts, banks organized as S 
corporations, and mutual banks—not for credit unions, however (Treasury 2010b). If a 
CDFI depository wholly defaulted on its debt, the principal and accrued interest were made 
immediately due and payable once the “event of default” transpired.  
Treasury did not initially have an exit strategy for CDCI investments. The scheduled 
increase in interest rates was intended to encourage participants to pay back their capital 
by 2018 (GAO 2016a). However, in August 2016, shortly after the Government 
Accountability Office noted Treasury’s lack of an exit strategy, Treasury announced an 
early repayment program to help it “dispose of its ownership interests as quickly as 
practicable” (Montano 2016). Under the program, Treasury allowed participants to repay 
their capital at “fair value,” which in practice meant a discount of usually 7% or 8% 
(Montano 2016). 
Outcomes 
Though Treasury allocated a maximum investment amount of $780.2 million, the CDCI 
ultimately disbursed $570.1 million to 84 institutions: 27 banks and thrifts, nine other 
banks organized as S corporations, and 48 credit unions (SIGTARP 2010c). The initial 
application window extended from February through April 2010 (SIGTARP 2010a). By the 
close of the application window, Treasury received applications from 56 credit unions and 
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37 banks and thrifts; 36 of the 37 bank applications came from CPP participants looking to 
exchange capital (SIGTARP 2010b). The total number of credit unions and other non-CPP 
participants that applied for CDCI capital has not been made public, as proposals submitted 
to primary regulators were kept confidential (Treasury 2012a).  
As of October 2020, 82 of the original 84 institutions exited the CDCI program: 54 fully 
repaid, 26 fully repurchased early, one went into bankruptcy, and one exited through a 
merger. Of the two remaining institutions, both partially repaid and one partially 
repurchased CDCI capital early (Treasury 2020). 
Premier Bank failed in early 2013 (Treasury 2019c). SIGTARP arrested the chairman of the 
board, along with two other board members and the bank president on charges of bank 
fraud (SIGTARP 2017). The bank obtained Treasury funds by falsifying its financial data 
and misrepresenting information to regulators. Treasury lost $6.7 million in TARP funds, 
and the bank’s failure cost the FDIC an estimated $64.1 million. 
Of the original 84 CDFI depositories, two credit unions have CDCI investments outstanding, 
with total obligations nearing $1 million (Treasury 2020). Total projected losses on the 
CDCI are about $70 million—versus $290 million in late 2010 (Treasury 2011b). These 
losses came from Treasury reselling the securities below their original purchase price and 
from writing off the capital of one bankrupt institution (Treasury 2019c). All other CDCI 
capital left Treasury’s balance sheet through full repayment, early repurchase, or a merger.  
One of the requirements of CDCI participation was the annual capital survey, which was 
intended to capture (via self-reporting) how the CDFI depositories used their capital 
(Treasury 2010b). These surveys were subjective; CDFI officials, in their own words, 
qualitatively described their use of capital with information not found in objective financial 
reports. From the 2017 survey of 19 CDCI and seven CPP respondents, the top cited uses of 
capital included: increasing lending, or reducing lending less than otherwise would have 
occurred (reported by 73.1%); increasing reserves for nonperforming assets (reported by 
30.8%), and holding as a nonleveraged increase to total capital (reported by 11.5%) 
(Treasury 2019a). According to the subjective surveys of the participants, the CDCI aided 
CDFIs in managing liabilities as well as assets. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: The CDCI was created in the likeness of the CPP to complement 
the CPP. Independent laws and Treasury initiatives supported small businesses 
thereafter. 
Most of the funds invested through the CDCI program went to former CPP participants that 
exchanged their CPP capital for more affordable CDCI capital (Treasury 2012b). 
Furthermore, 10 CPP exchanges qualified for an additional round of investment beyond the 
original CPP investment, totaling $100.7 million (SIGTARP 2010c). The majority of 
participants in the CDCI program were credit unions that had not been eligible for CPP 
capital (GAO 2014). CDFIs run less lucrative business models than mainstream financial 
institutions and encounter difficulties in securing long-term, low-cost capital from private 
investors in a time of crisis (Barr 2010).  
The CDCI copied the CPP’s architecture while softening key payment factors: the CDCI 
decreased initial interest/dividend rates from the CPP’s 5% to 2%, delayed the step-up 
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clauses from the CPP’s five years (after the original investment) to eight years, omitted the 
requirement on stock warrants, and increased the maximum issuance of government 
capital from the CPP’s 3% of risk-weighted assets to 5% (GAO 2014). 
Outside of TARP programs, the US Treasury also supported small businesses through the 
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which permitted Treasury to “make capital investments in 
eligible institutions in order to increase the availability of credit for small businesses, to 
amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax incentives for small business job 
creation, and for other purposes” (SBJA 2010). Through this act, Treasury launched the 
State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) and provided nearly $1.5 billion to states, 
territories, and municipalities (CREC/CS 2016). Rather than directly injecting capital into 
financial institutions, Treasury supported state programs that fell into one of five 
categories: capital access programs, loan guarantee programs, collateral support programs, 
loan participation programs, and venture capital programs (CREC/CS 2016). The SSBCI 
funded small state programs, which filled in market gaps left by larger federal programs 
(CREC/CS 2016). 
The CDFI Fund programs that followed the CDCI varied in their capital mechanisms, which 
included monetary awards, training programs, tax credits, grants, and bond guarantee 
programs (CDFI Fund, n.d.-b).4 
2. Legal Authority: The legal authority for the CDCI was granted under the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.  
The CDCI was legally authorized by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008—
specifically Title I: The Troubled Assets Relief Program (EESA 2008). The broad definition 
of “troubled assets” available for purchase could extend to unsecured subordinated 
debentures and preferred equity if the secretary of Treasury were to secure the approval of 
the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (EESA 2008, sec. 3). 
3. Communication: Treasury made CDCI information publicly available and 
equivocated the goal of the program. 
To communicate the CDCI, Treasury relied heavily on the Internet. Online documentation 
was robust, and Treasury website contained CDCI Program Documents, Program 
Agreements for all participating institutions, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about 
how to participate, and other announcements (Treasury 2016a). The application guidelines 
webpage held hyperlinks to the websites of federal regulators, where the program details 
and an application portal were ultimately accessible (Treasury 2010a).5 All of Treasury 
files were published in either PDF or Excel files. After the application window closed, 
 
4 Under §1204 of Dodd-Frank, the secretary of Treasury was permitted to “establish a multiyear program of 
grants, cooperative agreements, financial agency agreements, and similar contracts or undertakings to 
promote initiatives designed: (1.) to enable low- and moderate-income individuals to establish one or more 
accounts in a federally insured depository institution that are appropriate to meet the financial needs of such 
individuals; and (2.) to improve access to the provision of accounts, on reasonable terms, for low- and 
moderate-income individuals” (Dodd-Frank 2010). 
5 Federal regulators, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, advertised the CDCI using the main 
policy details of Treasury’s first press release: CDFI requirements, individual participation limits, low- and 
fixed-rate dividends, conversion from CPP, and the absence of stock warrants (Treasury/OCC 2010). The 
narratives presented by regulators appeared consistent with one another. 
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Treasury announced the CDCI once more via press release on September 30, 2010 
(Treasury 2010j). 
The initial response to the announcement of CDCI was mixed because the stated goals of 
the CDCI were, at first, unclear. As “early public announcements and congressional 
testimony about the program emphasized that the goal of the program was to increase 
small business lending,” some prospective applicants expressed concern about the 
relevance of the CDCI to their operations (GAO 2011). For example, the National Credit 
Union Administration and officials from a credit union industry group stressed that their 
institutions did not make small business loans.6 In subsequent discussions with these 
officials, Treasury assured applicants that the purpose of the CDCI was “mainly to capitalize 
[CDFI depositories] so they could achieve their economic development goals”—irrespective 
of the operations of the CDFI (GAO 2011).  
4. Administration: Treasury worked with financial regulators to review 
applications, to monitor outstanding funds, and to wind down investments. 
Treasury relied on primary financial regulators for assistance through every step of the 
CDCI’s lifespan. First, Treasury-regulator relationship was beneficial for Treasury. During 
the initial application window, potential CDCI participants were required to apply to their 
regulators (Treasury 2010a). The primary regulators then curated these applicant pools, 
endorsing the best applicants and forwarding them to Treasury for review (Massad and 
Kashkari 2018). The combined staff of Treasury and the primary regulators sought to 
prescreen institutions for eligibility and viability quickly and fairly (Massad and Kashkari 
2018). 
The CDCI program also helped primary regulators by strengthening some of the 
institutions they regulated. In several instances, the CDCI capital prevented prompt 
corrective action from the primary regulators (BCFCU/Treasury 2012; CCFCU/Treasury 
2010; CCFCU/Treasury 2011; NSCFCU/Treasury 2012). 
Treasury–regulator relationship made it easier for CDFI depositories to decide whether to 
apply for funding. The regulators decided whether the CDCI was an appropriate program 
for the CDFI in question, so the CDFIs could not expend resources by assembling an 
application to Treasury (Treasury 2010a).  
5. Governance: Independent assessments on the CDCI were assigned to the US 
Government Accountability Office and to the Special Inspector General for the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program. 
The status of the CDCI program as a whole was tracked and reported by both Treasury and 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO 2011). As part of the Emergency Economic 
Stability Act, the GAO had to report to Congress every 60 days on the progress of TARP 
programs (GAO 2011). Some of these reports described the ongoing status of the CDCI in 
fine detail (e.g., discussing the participants’ progress through the entire duration of the 
program). Other GAO reports were broad and tangentially discussed the CDCI as one of 
many capital programs. Detailed CDCI statistics (number of institutions repaid versus 
remaining, amount of Treasury capital outstanding, estimated lifetime cost to Treasury, 
 
6 It is not clear whether credit union representatives interpreted the CDCI’s initial goal of “small business 
lending” as a prerequisite to receive CDCI funding or as a required condition upon receiving CDCI funding  
(GAO 2011). 
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etc.) were included in Treasury’s daily TARP updates in early 2011 and monthly reports to 
Congress after December 2010 (Treasury 2011a; Treasury 2011b). 
The EESA established the Office of Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program for the purposes of auditing TARP programs (EESA 2008, sec. 121; SIGTARP n.d.). 
SIGTARP is a federal law enforcement agency that strives to “prevent fraud and abuse, 
identify wasteful spending, and drive improvements” (SIGTARP n.d.). SIGTARP’s quarterly 
reports contain financial data on the current status of Treasury’s outstanding investments, 
TARP-related crime, and SIGTARP’s ongoing recommendations for Treasury’s programs 
(SIGTARP 2014). These reports contain CDCI investment summaries, details of missed 
dividend payments, terms of senior securities and dividends, and a history of Treasury’s 
CDCI contract enforcement (SIGTARP 2014). 
6. Relevant Regulatory Changes: National Credit Union Administration changed 
several rules regarding secondary capital to accommodate low-income credit 
unions (LICUs) that sought capital under the CDCI. 
Treasury announced the CDCI on February 3, 2010, and on February 19, the National Credit 
Union Administration published several interim rule changes regarding secondary capital. 
The alterations were meant to harmonize NCUA regulations with CDCI terms and to head 
off regulatory barriers to participation faced by low-income credit unions. The new rules 
became effective September 23, 2010—one week before the CDCI’s funding/exchanges 
window closed. An industry associate remarked, “Without NCUA’s rapid and well-fashioned 
regulatory changes, CDCI would never have worked for credit unions” (Rosenthal 2012). 
The first interim rule relaxed redemption schedule limits for secondary capital obtained 
through government programs (NCUA 2010). According to 12 CFR § 701.34(d)(3), LICUs 
could begin to redeem secondary capital (limited to 20% of the original balance) only when 
the secondary capital accounts had less than five years of maturity left (NCUA n.d.). The 
limit on redemption amount increased as the remaining maturity on the account decreased. 
However, CDCI injected capital with 13 years of maturity, and a step-up clause kicked in at 
the eighth year. Therefore, subsection (d)(3) would have prevented CDCI’s LICU 
participants from repaying Treasury until after the step-up clauses had kicked in. The 
NCUA’s new rule, 12 CFR § 701.34(d)(4), exempted LICUs receiving capital under CDCI 
from subsection (d)(3), allowing LICUs to repay the government (and any of the 
government’s co-investors) in any amount after the first two years of investment. 
Subsection (d)(4)’s general language also applied to future government programs (NCUA 
2010). 
The second interim rule altered loss distribution procedures for secondary capital 
accounts, allowing LICUs two methods to subordinate matching secondary capital to 
government capital provided under the CDCI (NCUA 2010). The purpose was to ensure that 
the government’s CDCI investment was senior to—and would absorb losses only after—all 
other secondary capital. This rule’s language was specific to CDCI and did not apply to 
other government programs.  
The finalized interim rules also contained several technical adjustments. For secondary 
capital accounts with less than five years’ maturity, LICUs were required to report net asset 
value equal to the lesser of: “(1.) the remaining balance of the account after early 
redemption and losses; or (2.) the declining percentage calculations set forth in the net-
worth schedule that are based on the original balance of the account” (NCUA n.d.). The 
NCUA included this accounting clarification to avoid a scenario in which LICUs that had 
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partially redeemed CDCI capital could be forced to overstate the net-worth value of the 
corresponding secondary capital account (NCUA 2010). 
7. Term: The application window for the CDCI was three months. 
The application window for the program was about three full months: February 3 through 
April 30, 2010 (Treasury 2012a). This window was short because the CDCI needed to be 
fully functional within TARP’s disbursement period; Treasury’s funding authority expired 
on October 3, 2010 (Treasury 2010i). Treasury established the application window with 
the knowledge that it had a few months (May through September 2010) for application 
review, funding, and exchanges (Treasury 2012a). 
8. Eligible Institutions (1): Federally regulated US CDFI depositories were eligible 
to apply, but Treasury and the regulators selected which ones could participate 
in the CDCI, depending on the depository’s viability.  
The CDCI was available to “banks, savings associations, bank holding companies, savings 
and loan companies (which engage in solely or predominantly in activities that are 
permitted for financial holding companies over relevant law), and federally insured low-
income designated credit unions” (Treasury 2012a). The basic premise of the CDCI was a 
securities sale from a CDFI depository to Treasury, and the primary regulator facilitated 
the transaction at every step. The CDFI first discussed capital needs and the 
appropriateness of the CDCI with its primary regulator (Treasury 2010a). Then, the CDFI 
applied to its primary regulator (through the primary regulator’s website), which then 
decided whether to pass the CDFI’s application on to Treasury. Upon receiving applications, 
Treasury discussed the CDFI’s eligibility and viability with the primary regulator to either 
deny or accept the application. For state-regulated credit unions, eligibility and viability 
were decided jointly by state and federal regulators (Treasury 2012a). 
All TARP applicants were evaluated comprehensively, and overall CDFI financial health was 
assessed by capital, assets, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to risk (so-
called “CAMELS” ratings) (Massad and Kashkari 2018). Total application numbers for the 
CDCI are unknown.7 If the CDFI depository agreed to Treasury’s terms and conditions 
(including Treasury authority consistent with other TARP legislation), a contract was 
drawn and signed to commence the sale. Treasury document language does not indicate 
that the CDFI applicant had room to negotiate funding after receiving preliminary 
acceptance (Treasury 2010a; Treasury 2012a). Thereafter, the CDFI depository had to 
comply with Treasury’s additional reporting requirements and financial restrictions, in 
addition to the rules issued by the primary regulator.  
Several CDFI executives, lawyers, and industry insiders reported that the application 
process was challenging (Guggenheimer 2011). They stressed that TARP’s terms and 
conditions were designed for large banks, creating difficulties for CDFI depositories that 
lacked in-house lawyers or legal expertise (Rosenthal 2012). Consequently, dozens of 
 
7 Application numbers were reported by some—but not all—regulators. The FDIC reported that it received 64 
TARP CDCI applications, forwarded 12 to Treasury, and ultimately enrolled 10 into the CDCI program (FDIC 
2011). The Fed reported that 320 institutions applying to Treasury’s Small Business Lending Fund also 
applied to refinance TARP CPP and CDCI investments, yet 137 were ultimately approved for CPP/CDCI (BGFR 
2012). The NCUA reported that 111 credit unions applied to the NCUA for CDCI funding (NCUA 2011). While 
it is a challenge to measure exact program take-up, the bottom line is that Treasury and other regulators 
denied many applications. 
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applicants relied on pro bono support to apply to the program and comply with its terms 
after they were accepted (Guggenheimer 2011). 
It is worth noting that Treasury never listed preconditions that would prohibit an 
institution from participating—other than failing to follow the terms outlined in the CDCI 
application and documentation. Within the press releases, public FAQ documents, 
application materials, and the summary of terms documents, Treasury did not address 
minimum/maximum size of balance sheets, the requirement of participation (once an 
application was accepted), questions of systemic importance, or any other conditions of 
ineligibility.  
9. Eligible Institutions (2): Institutions that might not otherwise have been 
approved by their primary regulator could reach viability and become eligible to 
participate if they could raise capital from private investors, and were matched 
with Treasury capital up to 5% of risk-weighted assets (3.5% for credit unions). 
In some cases, the primary regulator required CDCI recipients to raise capital from private 
markets before they were allowed to secure Treasury funding. As described by Treasury, 
the regulator could take into account junior private investor capital raised alongside CDCI 
capital—so long as the private capital was an amount at least equal to the CDCI funding 
(Treasury 2012a). If CDCI funding was contingent on a private capital raise, the amount of 
CDCI funding still could not exceed the CDCI program limits: matching private capital up to 
5% of risk-weighted assets (3.5% for credit unions). More CDFI depositories became 
eligible for the program because the matching capital provision helped them reach a higher 
level of viability than what was possible by private capital or Treasury capital alone 
(Treasury 2010h). The private capital raised had to be junior to Treasury capital.  
10. Individual Participation Limit: Individual participation limits were dependent on 
the type of institution. 
The terms of CDCI’s individual participation limits were similar across banks/thrifts, credit 
unions, S corporations, and mutual banks (Treasury 2010b). Generally, participants were 
required to secure private capital only when mandated by their primary regulator. The 
level of public investments via CDCI could not exceed the level of private co-investment, 
and private capital had to be subordinated to the government’s CDCI securities. If a CPP 
participants wished to exchange CPP capital for CDCI securities, it could do so only after 
paying off the dividends/interest from Treasury’s prior investment, and applicants could 
not have violated any of the CPP terms and conditions before participating the CDCI. The 
maximum investment amounts can be found in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Maximum CDCI Investment Amount by Type of CDFI Depository 
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Source: Treasury 2010b.  
Credit unions issued debt in the form of unsecured subordinated debentures, which 
qualified as Tier 2 (or secondary) capital, to comply with the National Credit Union 
Administration standards (GAO 2014). The dividend and interest rates were determined by 
the tax treatment of the given institutions. 
Banks or thrifts issued perpetual preferred stock shares (Treasury 2010b). For bank 
holding companies and savings and loan holding companies, the preferred stock was 
cumulative—meaning that the participating bank had to pay Treasury all dividends owed 
before paying dividends on any other securities. For banks and thrifts, the preferred stock 
was noncumulative. Dividends were fixed at a 2% rate until the eighth anniversary of the 
closing date of the investment and then stepped up to 9% thereafter (Treasury 2010b). 
Finally, for banks or thrifts, there were no contractual restrictions on transfers of the 
securities; Treasury reserved the right to sell or auction off these securities (Treasury 
2010b). 
Credit unions issued unsecured subordinated debentures (i.e., debt) with a maturity of 
either eight or 13 years from the date of the investment (Treasury 2010e). On the date of 
maturity, the credit union paid back the principal plus accrued and unpaid interest. This 
debt paid cumulative interest: 2% annually until the eighth anniversary of the closing date 
of the investment and 9% annually thereafter (including a 9% default rate on missed 
payments from years prior) (Treasury 2010e).  
S corporations issued unsecured subordinated debentures with a maturity of either 13 
years for a bank/savings association or 30 years for a bank or savings and loan holding 
company (Treasury 2010d). On the date of maturity, the S corporation paid back the 
principal plus accrued and unpaid interest. The CDCI debt issued by S corporations paid 
cumulative interest, fixed at a 3.1% interest rate until the eighth anniversary of the closing 
date of the investment and then 13.8% annually thereafter (Treasury 2010d). The higher 
rates made up for the fact that S corporations banks do not pay corporate taxes (GAO 
2014). Assuming a 35% tax rate, these interest rates equated to 2% and 9%, respectively.  
Mutual banks issued unsecured subordinated debentures with a maturity of 13 years from 
the date of investment (Treasury 2010j). On the date of maturity, the mutual bank paid 
back the principal plus accrued and unpaid interest. As mutual banks also do not pay 
corporate taxes, the rates on their debt mirrored the rates on the S corporation debt—3.1% 
rising to 13.8% after eight years (Treasury 2010j). 
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11. Dividend/Interest Rates: Dividends/pricing terms were standardized across all 
participants, and fixed step-up clauses were applied. 
All interest payments were on a synchronized schedule (payments were made quarterly on 
February 15, May 15, August 15, and November 15 of each year—on the first business day 
on/after these dates) (Treasury 2010b).  
Treasury did not mandate any call options on the debt or warrants on the shares due to the 
EESA’s de minimis exception, which gave Treasury the right to waive warrant 
requirements for institutions with Treasury investments of $100 million or less (SIGTARP 
2010b). 
If Treasury investment was still standing after eight years, the institution was prohibited 
from making common stock dividend payments or repurchases.8 For credit unions, no 
special dividends could be declared or paid on any share accounts or other capital 
instruments. Finally, the CDFI depository could not enter into any transactions with 
affiliates unless: (1) the transaction was no less favorable to the institution and its 
subsidiaries than could be obtained from an unaffiliated third party, or (2) the transaction 
was approved by the audit committee or a comparable body of independent directors of 
the CDFI (Treasury 2010b). In addition to the preliminary agreements, data privileges, and 
capital caveats, Treasury relied on independent evaluators to track the CDCI. 
The step-up clauses associated with CDCI capital were fixed and transparent from the 
announcement of the program (GAO 2016a). This increase in dividend/interest rates was 
Treasury’s attempt to transition CDFI depositories from public to private funding after 
eight years (GAO 2016a).   
12. Other Conditions (1): Participating CDFI depositories were subject to various 
terms, and the CDCI securities held seniority within CDFI payment schedules. 
Any participating CDFI depository was required to “make representations and warranties 
described in various Treasury agreements” (Treasury 2010a). Among the conditions of 
participation in the CDCI was the requirement that “the applicant (and its covered officers 
and employees) agree to comply with the rules, regulations, and guidance of Treasury with 
respect to executive compensation, transparency, accountability and monitoring, as 
published and in effect at the time of the investment closing” (Treasury 2010a). 
In the publicly available “summary of terms” documents, Treasury let applicants know 
what data the CDFI depositories were expected to report after receiving CDCI funds 
(Treasury 2010b). As long as Treasury held at least 10% of its initial investment, the CDFI 
depository had to allow Treasury (along with Treasury’s affiliates) to manage, evaluate, or 
transfer Treasury’s investment. Treasury also had the right to examine and make copies of 
the CDFI’s corporate books, and to discuss the affairs, finances, and accounts with the 
CDFI’s principal officers (Treasury 2010b).  
 
8 When Treasury purchased preferred shares from banks or thrifts, questions arose regarding what to do 
about stock dilution for other shareholders. CDCI literature indicates that one of the acceptable scenarios in 
which a bank or thrift was able to repurchase its own shares was if/when CDCI participation diluted share 
prices and inadvertently reduced employee benefits as a result (Treasury 2010c). In this case, the CDFI 
bank/thrift was able to repurchase shares to offset (but not exceed) the share dilution amount—“consistent 
with past practice” (Treasury 2010c). 
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Treasury reserved the right to request and access the information through the institution’s 
federal regulator. While Treasury funds were outstanding, the CDFI depository had to 
deliver an audited consolidated balance sheet of the fiscal year, and audited consolidated 
statements of income, retained earnings, and cash flows (prepared with generally accepted 
accounting principles, or in comparative form from the previous fiscal year) (Treasury 
2010b). The CDFI depository was also required to deliver copies of any quarterly reports 
given to equity/debt holders. If the CDFI depository was ever audited or received an 
assessment on its internal controls, a copy of the assessment had to be delivered to 
Treasury as well.  
Finally, the CDFI depository had to complete an annual survey that detailed how it utilized 
the capital as well as the effects of the capital on its operations and status—this was known 
as a “capital survey” (Treasury 2010b). Though there was no language about stress tests or 
triage within CDCI documents, all TARP participants were expected to maintain “good 
standing” as part of Treasury’s ongoing evaluation of CDCI participants.9 
With the exception of credit union capital, the CDCI capital terms required CDCI capital to 
maintain seniority over comparable securities issued by the CDFI depository. This 
prioritized the repayment of taxpayer dollars amongst other stakeholders.  
Banks or thrifts issued preferred shares that were senior to common stock and pari passu 
(the same ranking) with existing or future authorized and issued preferred shares, and 
senior to preferred shares which (by their terms) ranked junior to any existing or future 
authorized and issued preferred shares (Treasury 2010b).  
Credit unions issued unsecured subordinated debentures that constituted secondary 
capital accounts rather than equity ownership (Treasury 2010e). Credit unions are mutual 
organizations whose members are shareholder-depositors (Fay n.d.). As such, they do not 
have common equity investors comparable to those in commercial banks. For credit 
unions, secondary capital accounts are analogous to common stock, and subordinated debt 
is a form of secondary capital (GAO 2014). As secondary capital accounts, the CDCI credit 
union debt was subordinated to all other claims against the credit union, including those of 
creditors, shareholders, and the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (Treasury 
2010e). The CDCI credit union debt was not subject to restoration or replenishment under 
any circumstances, and it was available to cover operating losses (that exceeded net 
available reserves) realized by the credit union (Treasury 2010e).  
S corporation debt ranked senior to the S corporation’s common stock (and any other class 
of equity permitted to the institution by law) (Treasury 2010d). The S corporations 
subordinated CDCI debt to: (1) claims of depositors and other debt obligations to general 
and secured creditors (if the S corporation was a bank or savings association), or (2) senior 
debt (if the S corporation was a bank or savings and loan holding company).  
Mutual bank debt ranked senior to mutual capital certificates and other capital instruments 
authorized under state law (Treasury 2010j). A mutual bank’s debt could be subordinated 
to claims of depositors and to the mutual bank’s other debt obligations to its general and 
secured creditors, unless these obligations were made explicitly pari passu or subordinate 
to the CDCI securities.  
 
9 “Good standing” refers to “material compliance with all the terms, conditions, and covenants of any TARP 
financial instrument, but not limited to, executive compensation requirements, reporting requirements, and 
payment of dividends or interest” (Treasury 2010a). 
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13. Other Conditions (2): CDCI executive compensation was congruent with TARP 
legislation. 
Participating CDFI depositories with company sizes of one to 25 employees could not 
distribute bonuses, depending on the size of the TARP assistance package—with 
exceptions for grandfathered bonuses. Stock bonuses could only be paid out in 25% 
increments alongside the repayment of TARP funds (Treasury 2010g). There were to be no 
golden parachutes for the senior executives (or five most highly compensated employees 
after them) if there were still TARP funds outstanding. Senior executive bonuses (and those 
of the next 20 highest paid employees) could be subject to clawback if it was discovered 
that these bonuses were based on inaccurate metrics. Tax gross-ups could not be paid to 
the senior executives (or the next 20 most highly compensated employees). The board had 
to adopt an excessive or luxury expenditures policy and post the policy on the institution’s 
website. The board also had to create a compensation committee of independent directors 
who reviewed and evaluated compensation plans twice per year to insulate the institution 
from unnecessary risks, and this committee had to file annual certifications and 
disclosures. The chief executive officer and chief financial officer had to file annual 
certifications covering compliance with the executive compensation and corporate 
governance requirements. If the institution had securities registered with the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission, then shareholders had to be provided with an annual advisory 
vote on executive compensation (“say on pay”).  
14. Fate of the Management: CDCI securities were nonvoting, but in the event of 
excessive nonrepayment of dividend or interest, Treasury gained voting rights 
and could replace board members. 
The CDCI securities were all issued with nonvoting rights. For banks, thrifts, and mutual 
banks, the exceptions to the nonvoting rights were class voting rights on: (1) any 
authorization or issuance of capital shares ranking senior to the CDCI preferred stock, (2) 
any amendment to the rights of CDCI preferred stock, or (3) any 
merger/exchange/dissolution/transaction that would adversely affect the rights of the 
CDCI preferred stock (Treasury 2010b).  
In the event of excessive nonrepayment (any dividend/interest not paid in full for eight 
periods), Treasury gained voting rights and could place two individuals on the CDFI 
depository’s board of directors—as was the case for banks/thrifts, S corporations, and 
mutual banks (Treasury 2010b). Election rights ended when the dividends were paid in full 
for four consecutive periods. There were no voting or membership rights whatsoever for 
CDCI debt from credit unions (Treasury 2010e). Mutual bank debt was subject to additional 
“state restrictions” (any state law that restricted the voting rights of CDCI debt that could 
not be modified, waived, or otherwise removed by the appropriate state authorities) 
(Treasury 2010j). 
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15. Exit Strategy (1): Events of default included receivership, conservatorship, or 
liquidation. 
If a CDFI depository wholly defaulted on its debt, the principal and accrued interest were 
made immediately due and payable once the event of default transpired. If a credit union 
defaulted, the National Credit Union Administration placed the credit union into 
receivership, conservatorship, or liquidation (Treasury 2010e). For state-chartered credit 
unions, the appropriate Social Security Administration conducted this event (Treasury 
2010e). S corporations and mutual banks faced similar consequences by their respective 
regulators (Treasury 2010d). Bank (or savings and loan) holding companies could declare 
bankruptcy and place any major bank subsidiary into receivership (Treasury 2010d). 
16. Exit Strategy (2): Treasury considered various exit options but decided in 2016 
to enable early repurchases at a discount. 
Weighing the CDFI interests while protecting taxpayer investments, Treasury considered 
several options for each institution to exit the program. In August 2016, after the GAO 
noted Treasury’s lack of an exit strategy, Treasury implemented a program that allowed 
institutions to buy back their capital at a discount (Montano 2016). 
While Treasury preferred that the CDFI depositories simply paid back the investments in 
full, partial repayment was possible if the amount was the lesser of 5% of the original 
injection or $100,000 (Robinson 2017). The majority of CDFI depositories paid back by 
repurchasing the capital outright.  
Treasury conducted auctions as part of its wind-down strategy for the CPP and 
acknowledged that this was also an option for the CDCI (GAO 2016a). However, the 
possibility of auctions was contingent on investor demand for the securities, the quality of 
the underlying financial institutions, and the approval of primary regulators (GAO 2016a).  
Debt restructuring was also an option but not with respect to the interest rates on CDCI 
securities themselves: “Treasury officials noted that, [as of June 2016], they [had] no plans 
to alter the terms of the program’s rates unless a financial institution was distressed and 
unable to pay the increased rate. Treasury officials stated that the increases were designed 
to encourage institutions to replace public capital with private capital within a reasonable 
amount of time (8 years) and were a cornerstone of the CDCI program” (GAO 2016a).  
Restructuring was an option only for distressed CDCI participants that were first willing 
and able to raise new capital from outside investors (or a merger) (GAO 2016a). Through 
the inclusion of a private investor, Treasury received cash or other securities that might be 
sold more easily than preferred stock, but the restructured investments were sometimes 
sold at a discount to par value. Treasury officials noted that Treasury would approve 
restructurings for CDCI only if the terms represented a fair and equitable financial outcome 
for taxpayers. 
For the purposes of “winding down TARP programs in a manner that balances speed of exit 
with maximizing returns to the taxpayer,” Treasury took proposals from CDCI participants 
to repurchase their outstanding securities at fair value (Montano 2016). Since fair value 
was typically10 calculated at a discount 7% or 8% under the notional value, this provided 
 
10 One CDFI depository received a 20% discount; M&F Bancorp, Inc. repurchased its preferred shares at $800 
per share on December 20, 2016 (Treasury 2019c).  
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CDCI participants with an incentive to pay back early; without the discount, they would 
have a strong incentive to retain the cheap CDCI capital until the step-up date in 2018, 
when it would suddenly become very expensive. In November 2016, SIGTARP 
recommended to Treasury that it not indicate what discount Treasury would accept; this 
would help Treasury ensure the highest possible taxpayer repayment (SIGTARP 2017). 
This early repurchase initiative accepted applications between August 1 and December 9, 
2016 (Montano, McArdle, and Hall 2016). According to the GAO report released during this 
period, each CDFI depository must have proposed to repurchase at least 50% of their 
outstanding CDCI securities for Treasury to sign on (GAO 2016b). One early repurchaser, 
Arkansas-based Southern Bancorp, described the early repurchase terms as “very 
favorable” (Southern Bancorp 2017). By the end of the early repurchase period, 27 of the 
57 CDCI participants remaining in 2016 had used it; 26 institutions fully repaid and one 
partially repaid their CDCI investments (Treasury 2019c).  
III. Evaluation 
There are three types of evaluations for the CDCI: (1) CDFI associates and participants 
offering anecdotes on the overall attractiveness of the program, (2) SIGTARP criticizing 
Treasury’s oversight of the investments, and (3) GAO and a few academics exploring the 
effects of the program on participants’ financial health and behavior. 
Several CDFI representatives have claimed that the announcement of CDFI-targeted TARP 
funds inspired many depositories to pursue CDFI certification, in part, because they wanted 
to qualify for CDCI funding (Gambrell 2011; Ratigan 2014; Rosenthal 2012). Treasury’s 
CDFI Fund certified or recertified nearly 200 of the then-total 931 CDFIs in 2010, including 
95 in the last two months of the CDCI’s application period (Gambrell 2011). Of the 20 banks 
that received CDFI certification in 2010, 18 received CDCI funds (Longworth and 
Newberger 2011). From the CDCI’s $570.1 million disbursement, more than $500 million 
went to CDFI banks—61% of this subset went to CDFI banks certified in 2010 (Longworth 
and Newberger 2011). A similar dynamic played out for CDFI credit unions; of the 48 credit 
unions that received CDCI investments, 15 were certified during the first nine months of 
2010 (Rosenthal 2012). The CDCI’s popularity is evidenced by the high number of 
institutions that pursued CDFI certification during the program’s application period, the 
fact that almost half of CDCI participants were newly certified CDFIs, and the majority 
disbursed funds having gone to newly certified CDFIs. 
Heads of CDFI depositories have praised the CDCI because the additional funds allowed 
them to extend more credit to their clients. According to interviews conducted with CDFI 
banks, they pursued CDFI certification, in part, to qualify for programs such as the CDCI, 
which served as a valuable source of capital (Longworth and Newberger 2011). From a 
CDFI bank’s perspective, the CDCI offered tier-1 capital at rates that were cheap compared 
to other TARP funds (Longworth and Newberger 2011). The relatively low cost of capital 
enabled CDFI banks to make loans and investments that they otherwise might not have 
been able to make (City First Bank of DC 2010; Longworth and Newberger 2011). Similarly, 
several heads of CDFI credit unions suggested that they used CDCI capital to meet 
increased credit demand from nonprofit organizations, underbanked communities, and 
customers that were otherwise underserved by traditional lenders (Abello 2021; Rosenthal 
2012). CDFI banks and credit unions alike recognized that signing up to receive secondary 
capital from the government meant more legal fees and interest costs, which they knew 
were meant to encourage repayment within eight years (Rosenthal 2012; Surgeon et al. 
2020). Though the CDCI’s terms of repayment and compliance made the temporary loan 
less attractive to CDFI depositories than grants, which represented permanent equity that 
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did not have to be repaid, the CDCI was still appealing because it was a single capital source 
much larger than what was normally available to CDFI depositories through grants, fiscal 
transfers, and other related programs (Rosenthal 2012). 
According to SIGTARP, Treasury failed to enforce mandatory use of capital reporting, so it 
is challenging to determine whether CDCI funds were used as intended or not (Rehm 2011; 
SIGTARP 2014). Robinson (2017) criticizes the CDCI’s weakly positive effects on CDFI 
depositories’ small business lending, but lending was only one of many measures used to 
assess CDFI financial health (Massad and Kashkari 2018). Pana and Wilson (2012) find that 
credit unions eligible for TARP funds were more likely to participate in CDCI if they were 
headquartered in the district of a US House Financial Services Committee member. 
Treasury officials who oversaw the selection process say they sought to head off any 
political pressure: “all Congressional calls and input were directed to [political appointees] 
and kept away from those reviewing applications” (Massad and Kashkari 2018). These 
officials suggest that all TARP applicants were evaluated comprehensively, and overall 
CDFI financial health was assessed by CAMELS ratings (Massad and Kashkari 2018). 
The program’s primary objective was changed from fostering small business lending 
(through CDFI depositories) to broadly helping participants achieve their independent 
goals. At the program’s announcement in February 2010, it was portrayed as a program to 
help “Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) that lend to small businesses 
in the country’s hardest-hit communities” (emphasis added) (Treasury 2010h). At its onset, 
Treasury repeatedly advertised the CDCI as a program for “small business lending”—a 
phrase that occurs several times throughout the initial press release and public messages. 
After Treasury heard the concerns of potential CDCI applicants that did not specialize in 
small business lending, it revised its message about the CDCI’s objective to something more 
inclusive: “to capitalize CDFIs to carry out their economic development goals” (GAO 2011). 
After initially claiming that small business lending was the primary objective of the CDCI 
(and the primary metric of success), Treasury deferred to CDFI depositories for a 
subjective measure of success via self-reporting.11, 12 This shift became an issue when CDFI 
depositories failed to report their mandatory use of capital because Treasury did not know 
what a large portion (in 2012, the majority) of CDCI participants were doing with Treasury 
funds throughout the lifespan of the program (SIGTARP 2014). Treasury relied on the CDFI 
depositories to set their own goals, failed to hold participants accountable through 
reporting standards that were mandated by CDCI contracts, and did not enforce its own 
voting rights after interest/dividend payments were skipped. With respect to the initial 
objective, limited research shows that the CDCI did not spur CDFI depositories to extend 
more small business loans (Robinson 2017).  
In a 2014 quarterly report to Congress, the Special Inspector General for the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program highlighted oversight issues in Treasury’s handling of CDCI. An 
increasing number of CDCI participants failed to submit the use of capital survey—a 
mandatory part of receiving Treasury funding (SIGTARP 2014). Of the 84 CDCI 
participants, 14 did not send the annual use of capital survey in 2010, 22 in 2011, and 56 in 
2012. “Never once in the history of the CDCI program have all 84 CDCI banks and credit 
 
11 This notion is reinforced by the absence of any question about “small business lending” in the annual use of 
capital surveys (Treasury 2019a). 
12 In his exit interview, former SIGTARP Neil Barofsky discusses similar issues with the CPP: “What is 
Treasury’s response [to the lack of lending]? They changed the goal. The [new] goal was to make money. The 
CPP, according to Treasury officials, by any objective measure was a success. What about the objective 
measure that you announced, to restore lending? It didn’t work. But again, if you change your goals along the 
way you get to declare everything a success. That doesn’t make it a good government program” (Rehm 2011). 
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unions complied with the contractual requirement to report annually to Treasury on the 
use of their funds” (SIGTARP 2014). If Treasury did not understand the financial decision-
making of participating institutions, the report went, then Treasury could not offer sound 
advice/guidance to help them achieve their subjective goals, or accurately gauge the overall 
success of this program (SIGTARP 2014). Former SIGTARP Neil Barofsky complained about 
this issue in his 2011 exit interview and suggested that Treasury “should have required 
lenders to disclose how TARP funds were used” (Rehm 2011). 
Treasury also failed to act consistently on its own right to attend board meetings and 
appoint directors in the event of consecutive missed interest/dividend payments (SIGTARP 
2014). In the instance of PGB Holding, Inc., the CDCI participant had missed 12 Treasury 
dividend payments, yet by April 2014, Treasury had failed to place any Treasury 
representatives on the company’s board (SIGTARP 2014). On the other hand, when First 
American International Corp. missed enough payments to warrant a Treasury observer at 
its board meetings, Treasury requested an observer in February 2013. “The bank rejected 
Treasury’s request, but subsequently paid the missing dividends”; Treasury’s intent to 
enforce securities contracts led to better compliance. Treasury also sent observers to Tri-
State Bank and Carver Bancorp (SIGTARP 2017). 
Despite the equivocation of program goals, some scholars researched the CDCI under the 
original premise of small business lending. Robinson (2017) analyzes the financial data of 
CDCI participants and determines that small business loan growth is positively correlated 
with high levels of bank capital, liquidity, and high ratios of business loans to assets 
(Robinson 2017). Furthermore, growth in business loans is associated with declines in 
asset quality and increases in profitability. Comparing CDCI participants to minority-owned 
banks, the paper concludes that “growth in small business lending is strongest among CDCI 
participants, but participation in the CDCI does not ensure stronger growth in small 
business lending for any year after participation in the CDCI.” 
On the basis of small business lending growth, the paper dubs the CDCI a “failure” and 
attributes that failure to the lack of financial incentives to encourage participants to 
originate more small business loans (Robinson 2017). However, the study lumps all CDFI 
depositors together—rather than focusing on those whose stated purpose was to provide 
small business loans—and includes those that specialized in other financial products like 
mortgage loans or small personal loans. 
The financial health of most CDCI participants improved since they received investments. 
Between the end of 2011 and March 31, 2016—a time when most participants were still in 
the program—the median of five of six financial health indicators improved (GAO 2016a).13 
However, the median of two financial health indicators weakened after December 2014. 
 
13 These indicators include:  
(1.) the Texas ratio, which helps determine the likelihood of a bank’s failure by comparing its troubled 
loans to its capital and is calculated by dividing a bank’s nonperforming assets plus loans 90 or more 
days past due by its tangible equity and reserves. Lower Texas ratios indicate stronger financial health. 
(2.) Noncurrent loan percentage, which is the sum of loans and leases 90 days or more past due and in 
nonaccrual status. Lower noncurrent loan percentages indicate stronger financial health. (3.) The net 
charge-offs to average loans ratio is the total dollar amount of loans and leases charged off (removed 
from balance sheet because of uncollectability), less amounts recovered on loans and leases previously 
charged off divided by the average dollar value of loans outstanding for the period. Lower net charge-off 
to average loans ratios indicate stronger financial health. (4.) The return on average assets measure 
shows how profitable a bank is relative to its total assets and how efficiently management uses its assets 
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The average institution took about 2,078 days to exit the CDCI.14 After interviewing CDCI 
participants, industry insiders, and federal regulators, the GAO offers a few explanations 
for the program length: CDFI depositories waited until cheaper capital was available before 
returning to the private market and relied on CDCI capital to further expand operations, 
and some were wary of current and future (e.g.: Basel III regulatory reforms) capital 
requirements (GAO 2014).  
According to CCFCU/Treasury capital surveys from 2010 through 2017, of the two 
institutions still on Treasury’s balance sheet, each appears to use Treasury for two broad 
purposes: to comply with one’s primary financial regulation, and to expand financial 
services and products (CCFCU/Treasury 2010 – 2017). 
  
 
to generate earnings. It is calculated by dividing a bank’s net income by the average of its assets over a 
specific period, such as a quarter or year. Higher returns on average assets indicate stronger financial 
health. (5.) Common equity tier 1 ratio is a bank’s equity capital excluding any preferred shares, retained 
earnings, and disclosed reserves as a share of risk-weighted assets. Higher common equity tier 1 ratios 
indicate stronger financial health. (6.) Reserve to nonperforming loans are the funds a bank holds to 
cover loan losses divided by loans that are 90 days or more past due. Higher reserves to nonperforming 
loans indicate stronger financial health. 
14 This number does not include the CDCI participants remaining as of July 2019 (Treasury 2019b). 
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